When the US government banned and unbanned TikTok in early 2025, millions of US TikTok users moved to alternative platforms, notably Chinese app RedNote. From a safety point of view, it wasn’t a very good idea: RedNote not only shares TikTok’s cybersecurity flaws, but it also may pose greater security […]

Reporters Without Borders (RSF) introduces techniques for journalists to circumvent online censorship in authoritarian regimes, and provides methods to maintain secure communication and access to information. Authoritarian regimes use internet censorship to block information, communication, and access to vital services. Online censorship is particularly robust during socio-political crises, protests, significant […]

Internet service providers have the power to block websites, messaging apps, and online services with no warning, often on request of authorities. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) introduces OONI tools that journalists can use to check whether a website is blocked and collect evidence of internet censorship. Internet […]

In highly-censored regimes, circumvention tools like Tor — a browsing system which provides anonymity and unrestricted internet access — are often targeted by censors. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) introduces Tor bridges and explains how this technology can be used by journalists to access Tor. After blocking websites […]

“Investigating WeChat” is a four-part series, exploring the complexities and threats posed by Chinese social apps WeChat and its domestic version Weixin. In this final article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) outlines proactive steps journalists can take to minimise risks while using Weixin and WeChat. Using Weixin or its international clone […]

“Investigating WeChat” is a four-part series exploring the complexities and threats posed by Chinese social apps WeChat and its domestic version Weixin. In this article,  Reporters Without Borders (RSF) scrutinises the intricate ways in which international WeChat remains tied to domestic Weixin. Although the international version of the social app […]

“Investigating WeChat” is a four-part series exploring the complexities and threats posed by Chinese social apps WeChat and its domestic version Weixin. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) introduces the security and privacy risks associated with the Weixin version.  Weixin, at the crossroads of a messaging app, a social […]

“Investigating WeChat” is a four-part series exploring the complexities and threats posed by Chinese social apps WeChat and its domestic version Weixin. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) looks at the differences and resemblances between the two versions. WeChat, known in China as Weixin, was launched in 2011 by […]

“Investigating WeChat” is a four-part series exploring the complexities and threats posed by Chinese social apps WeChat and its domestic version Weixin. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) brushes over the main characteristics of these apps and provides journalists with recommendations for usage. WeChat (and its domestic version Weixin), […]

Facial recognition is ubiquitous in China, and is being used by the Chinese regime to exert heavy social control over its population. This is a major threat to free and independent journalism and puts journalists at great risk. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) discusses why one cannot avoid facial recognition in […]

LINE, a messaging app mostly used in Asia, offers end-to-end encryption but also presents back-end security concerns and a history of data breaches. In this article, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) investigates the safety risks associated with LINE and how best to use the messaging app safely. LINE, a Japanese messaging […]